• Paul R. Jones

    A simple question for politicians and MSM to answer…a question so simple, it is hard:

    “Where is the proclamation ratified by the voters of the United States that amends the Constitution to make the health, welfare, safety and benefits of a select group of U.S./State citizens distinguishable because of their “Indian ancestry/race?”

    • Wulf

      Actually, the original text of the US Constitution on the subject of Tribal relations is maintained today, and the US, per official established statements, recognizes Indigenous Tribal Nations as, “domestic, dependent sovereign nations.”

      What does this phrase mean?
      It means that:

      1. The US Federal Executive (the President & cabinet) has no authority whatsoever in the governance of Indigenous Tribal Nations.

      2. States have no authority whatsoever in the governance of Indigenous Tribal Nations.

      3. US Congress has limited authority in the governance of Indigenous Tribal Nations, but no more authority than US Congress has over individual states.

      4. The United States of America recognizes the sovereignty of Indigenous Tribal Nations.

      5. Unless US Congress removes a specific power from Indigenous Tribal Nations through Constitutional Amendment, all powers of are assumed to be retained by Indigenous Tribal Nations.
      Per the US Constitution, US Congress has the power to “regulate (interpreted to mean, “facilitate”) Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes,” (Article I, Section 8).

      6. The power of self-governance is not delegated to Indigenous Tribal Nations by US Congress; rather, the power for Tribal self-governence is inherent, and implicit, to Tribal status within the US Constitution.

      7. “United States v Mazurie” (1975): Indigenous Tribal Nations are sovereign over Tribal lands.

      8. “Montana v United States (1981): Indigenous Tribal Nations, “possess inherent power over their internal affairs, and civil authority over non-members within tribal lands to the extent necessary to protect health, welfare, economic interests or political integrity of the tribal nation.”

      9. Tribal sovereignty is a type of “parallel sovereignty.” Tribal laws are recognized by the United States; however, to become law, Tribal “bills” must pass Secretarial Review by the Department of the Interior to become laws. Therefore, Tribal Nations are constrained by acts of US Congress, but not subordinate to US Congress as governing authorities.

      10. “Indian Citizenship Act of 1924:” All Indigenous resident Americans are US citizens. Therefore, all Indigenous Americans residing in the United States are subject to US criminal law. However, Tribal citizenship is not subordinate to US citizenship.

      11. “Duro v Reina” (1990): Indigenous Tribal Nations, “possess their traditional and undisputed power to exclude persons who they deem to be undesirable from tribal lands…. Tribal law enforcement authorities have the power if necessary, to eject them. Where jurisdiction to try and punish an offender rests outside the tribe, tribal officers may exercise their power to detain and transport him to the proper authorities.”

      To summarize:

      In accordance with these laws and Constitutional definitions, the US Federal Executive’s declarations and/or commands, regarding the governance of sovereign Indigenous Tribal Nations and lands, utterly lack any legitimacy, and carry no authority whatsoever. Therefore, the April 26, 2017, executive order issued by Trump to US Department of the Interior Secretary Zinke, stands upon no authoritative legal grounds; and Secretary Zinke is not, nor ever has been, required to comply, with Mr. Trump’s non-applicable executive order.

      The Bear Ears National Monument was successfully established as a National Monument, and therefore a Federally recognized protected site, in December 2016, with the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition specified as the steward of the Bears Ears protected site.

      Commissioner Lyman of San Juan County, Utah, may hold a shared opinion with Secretary Zinke and/or Mr. Trump. However, as an officeholder within the interior government of Utah, Commissioner Lyman’s opinion on the matter of the Bear Ears National Monument status, is, according to Federal law, completely irrelevant to the Monument’s status. Commissioner Lyon has no authority to influence the matter of the site’s protected status.

      Given that Bears Ears National Monument is:

      • Maintained by the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition

      • Seemingly, supported by Vice-Chair Udall of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs

      • Apparently supported by U.S. Senator Udall (D-NM): a member of U.S. Congress (and, a Senator with specific authority over the matter, no less)

      • Receiving immediate defense from Native American Rights Fund Attorney Landreth

      • Spoken for, by Navajo Nation Attorney General Branch, as a matter of the existent rights of the people of the impacted Tribal Nations

      • Supported for continued maintenance, without Federal governmental involvement nor reduction, by the general public of Utah

      … It appears, both in legal writ, and relevant leader activity, that for all practical and hypothetical purposes, the rights to Bear Ears National Monument protected land, belongs to the five Indigenous Tribal Nations represented within the Bear Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition.

      Therefore, Mr. Trump and Secretary Zinke, act in violation of several U.S. Federal laws and Domestic International Treaties*, the most severe possible conviction for which, is High Treason against the United States of America.

      *This phrase may appear paradoxical, but it refers to the relations between the US, and the International Indigenous Tribes- such as the Ute, Hopi, & Zuni tribes, or the Bear Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition authorities- which are located within the domestic political territorial bounds of the United States

      • Paul R. Jones

        Provide the Amendment(s) to the Constitution to make your post true! Politicians-state and federal-have no Constitutional authority to enlarge or abridge one’ U.S./State citizenship.

        Your post is merely regurgitating the same canards put forth by politicians-state and federal-, U.S./State citizens with “Indian ancestry/race” and their advocate without presenting a single shred of Constitutional authority to make any of your post true post The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924!

        Provide the Amendments to overcome these 3-SCOTUS decisions on ‘U.S./State citizenship’ and the Constitution and Amendments to the Treaty Clause (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2,) to over-come this essay on excerpted text on treaties posted below the SCOTUS decisions:

        1. United States Supreme Court AFROYIM v. RUSK, (1967) No. 456 Argued:
        February 20, 1967 Decided: May 29, 1967

        “(a) Congress has no express power under the Constitution to strip a person of citizenship, and no such power can be sustained as an implied attribute of sovereignty, as was recognized by Congress before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment; and a mature and well-considered dictum in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 827, is to the same effect. Pp. 257-261.

        (b) The Fourteenth Amendment’s provision that “All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States . . .” completely controls the status of citizenship and prevents the cancellation of
        petitioner’s citizenship. Pp. 262-268”

        2. United States Supreme Court OSBORN v. BANK OF U.S., (1824) No. 80 Argued: Decided: March 19, 1824

        “A naturalized citizen is indeed made a citizen under an act of Congress, but the act does not proceed to give, to regulate, or to prescribe his capacities. He becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights.
        The simple power of the national Legislature, is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects
        the individual. The constitution then takes him up, and, among other rights, extends to him the capacity of suing in the Courts of the United States, precisely under the same circumstances under which a native might sue. He is [22 U.S. 738, 828] distinguishable in nothing from a native
        citizen, except so far as the constitution makes the distinction. The law makes none.”

        3. United States Supreme Court

        No. 93-1841 Argued: January 17, 1995 Decided: June 12, 1995:

        SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

        “I join the opinion of the Court, except Part III-C, and except insofar as it may be inconsistent with the following: In my view, government can never have a “compelling interest” in discriminating on the basis of race in order
        to “make up” for past racial discrimination in the opposite
        direction. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon the individual, see Amdt. 14, 1
        (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person” the equal
        protection of the laws) (emphasis added), and its rejection of dispositions based on race, see Amdt. 15, 1 (prohibiting abridgment of the right to vote “on account of race”) or based on blood, see Art. III, 3 (“[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood”); Art. I, 9 (“No
        Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States”). To pursue the concept of racial entitlement – even for the most admirable and benign of purposes – is to reinforce and preserve for future [ ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 2] mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.

        It is unlikely, if not impossible, that the challenged program would survive under this understanding of strict scrutiny, but I am content to leave that to be decided on remand. [ ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 1]”

        JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

        “I agree with the majority’s conclusion that strict scrutiny applies to all government classifications based on race. I write separately, however, to express my disagreement with the premise underlying JUSTICE STEVENS’ and JUSTICE GINSBURG’S dissents: that there is a racial paternalism exception to the principle of equal protection. I believe that there is a “moral [and] constitutional equivalence,” post, at 3, (STEVENS, J., dissenting),
        between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of equality. Government cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and protect us
        as equal before the law.

        That these programs may have been motivated, in part, by good intentions cannot provide refuge from the principle that under our Constitution, the government
        may not make distinctions on the basis of race. As far as the Constitution is concerned, it is irrelevant whether a government’s racial classifications are drawn by those who wish to oppress a race or by those who have a sincere desire to help those thought to be disadvantaged. There can be no doubt that the paternalism that [ ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 2] appears to lie at the heart of this program is at war with the principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution. See Declaration of Independence (“We hold these truths to be self-evident,
        that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness”).

        These programs not only raise grave constitutional questions, they also undermine the moral basis of the equal protection principle. Purchased at the price of
        immeasurable human suffering, the equal protection principle reflects our Nation’s understanding that such classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on the individual and our society. Unquestionably, “[i]nvidious
        [racial] discrimination is an engine of oppression,” post, at 3. It is also true that “[r]emedial” racial preferences may reflect “a desire to foster equality in society,” ibid. But there can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and
        pernicious as any other form of discrimination. So-called “benign” discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without their patronizing
        indulgence. Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the government’s use of race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are “entitled” to preferences. Indeed, JUSTICE STEVENS once recognized the real harms stemming from seemingly
        “benign” discrimination. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (noting that “remedial” race legislation “is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those who are granted this special [ ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 3] preference are less qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their race”).

        In my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. * In
        each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple.”


        “The object of treaties is the regulation of intercourse with foreign nations, and is external.”

        An especially interesting piece of evidence supporting the conclusion that the Treaty Clause was intended and
        understood by the Framing and Ratifying Conventions not to authorize the President and Senate, by a treaty, either (a) to override the Constitution, in whole or in part, or (b) to make domestic law (as distinguished from governance
        of relations with foreign governments),

        [Section 52.] “Treaties are legislative acts. A treaty is a law of the land. It differs from other laws only as it must have the consent of a foreign nation, being but a contract with respect to that nation . . . 2. By the general power to make treaties, the Constitution must have intended to
        comprehend only those objects which are usually regulated by treaty, and cannot be otherwise regulated. 3. It must have meant to except out of these the rights reserved to the States; for surely the President and Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole Government
        is interdicted from doing in any way.”

        fallacious statement is that a treaty “can override the
        Constitution;” which defies historical truth, as we have seen. A related
        and most preposterous allegation is that a treaty “can cut across the
        rights given the people by the constitutional Bill of Rights”–than which
        nothing could be further from the truth, partly for two reasons: the
        Constitution does not authorize any such treaty and, secondly, the people are,
        of course, given their rights by God and not by themselves through their own
        creation: the Constitution (including its Bill of Rights, or Bill of
        Prohibitions, Amendments). The quoted statement is farcical.