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In an era of widespread anger over unaffordability, corruption, inequality, and sclerotic institutions, we need to think much bigger about reforming US democracy. People are putting forward bold proposals to create a multiparty electoral system, abolish the Senate and the Electoral College, and transform the Supreme Court. To build a multiracial democracy that is resilient to authoritarianism, we also need that same level of ambition in rethinking democracy locally where government most directly touches people’s daily lives: in cities, counties, schools, and public agencies.

Sixty years ago, the United States attempted exactly that. The federal government launched the Community Action Program (CAP), one of the most ambitious democratic experiments in American history. CAP sought not merely to reduce poverty, but to redistribute governing power itself. The experiment lasted only a few years before it was largely dismantled amid fierce political conflict, and it is usually remembered, if at all, as a failed anti-poverty program.

That is a mistake.

[Community Action Program] is usually remembered—if at all—as a failed initiative of President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty. But that framing obscures what made it remarkable.

Across the political spectrum, most Americans believe government no longer responds to ordinary people nor improves their lives in tangible ways. Representative democracy will always remain the constitutional foundation of our political system, but elections alone cannot generate the accountability, trust, and civic capacity that healthy democracy requires. We need stronger institutions that enable government to govern with communities rather than simply for them.

CAP—with its mandate of “maximum feasible participation”—was the country’s first major attempt to build those institutions. It’s time to revive that audacious democratic ambition.

Community Action as Democracy-Building

CAP is usually remembered as an ineffective part of President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty, but that framing obscures what made it remarkable. CAP was one of the most daring democratic reforms in modern American history—a politically explosive, deeply imperfect effort to redistribute governing power. Its history offers rich lessons for how we might build a new generation of democratic institutions, this time with the benefit of six decades of additional learning.

In 1964, amid the Civil Rights Movement, urban uprisings, and growing national awareness of the depths of both Black and White poverty, Congress passed the Economic Opportunity Act. Its most radical provision required the “maximum feasible participation” of poor people in planning and governing anti-poverty programs.

That phrase was revolutionary. Rather than designing programs for poor communities, the federal government sought to create institutions through which poor people could help govern them.

Within two years, more than 1,000 CAP agencies—the local institutional vehicles for this new model of shared governance—were established in cities and counties across the country. Through these agencies, hundreds of millions of federal dollars flowed to neighborhood organizations, legal services, Head Start, job training, community development corporations, and countless other local initiatives. Implementation varied enormously from place to place, but the underlying premise remained the same: Residents must be given a meaningful role in helping to set priorities, shape programs, and hold public institutions accountable.

For perhaps the first time in American history, hundreds of thousands of low-income Americans—not only Black communities, but also Mexican American, Puerto Rican, Native, Asian American, and poor White communities—were invited not merely to vote or offer public input, but to exercise meaningful governing authority.

The results were extraordinary and messy.

CAP helped launch a generation of organizations and leaders who reshaped American civic life. It strengthened organizing among farmworkers, expanded opportunities for tribal governments to exercise greater control over federal resources, supported community development efforts in Appalachia, and incubated organizations at the forefront of the Black Power, Chicano, Puerto Rican, and Asian American movements. It also trained a generation of community leaders, especially Black women, who would later enter public agencies and forever change the composition of government itself.

Yet from the beginning, CAP was one of the most politically controversial elements of the War on Poverty.

In city after city, mayors, political machines, and established nonprofit organizations suddenly found themselves competing with newly empowered neighborhood organizations for funding, influence, and legitimacy. In Philadelphia, for instance, Mayor James Tate agreed to allow residents to elect representatives to the city’s anti-poverty board but then worked behind the scenes to shape who would ultimately be nominated and elected. Community organizers pushed back, winning important concessions while exposing a larger question that haunted the program nationwide: Who had legitimate authority to speak for poor communities?

Elsewhere, conflict flared up along lines of race. In Los Angeles, for example, Black and Mexican American communities found themselves competing over a limited pool of CAP funds. This was in part due to the failure of both Congress and President Johnson to pair CAP with a robust national redistributive program, which set up inevitable local conflicts over scarce resources. It also played out within the context of a rapidly changing demographic and political landscape, urban uprisings (in Los Angeles, Watts burned in August 1965), and White backlash.

The tensions that emerged around the program were thus never simply about the program itself. They reflected much larger conflicts over race, democracy, and the distribution of political power.

The backlash came quickly.

CAP’s architects failed because they underestimated the institutional and political work required to make ambitious democratic reform both operationally effective and politically durable.

Big-city mayors argued that Washington had empowered unelected neighborhood organizations at the expense of democratically elected local governments. Facing sustained lobbying from local officials, growing public backlash to urban unrest, and mounting conservative opposition to civil rights and the War on Poverty, Congress weakened CAP’s commitment to “maximum feasible participation.” It returned authority to local governments and transformed most CAP agencies into largely depoliticized social-service providers. Although more than 1,000 such agencies still exist today, America’s largest experiment in shared governance was largely dismantled just three years after it began.

For decades, this history has often been treated as evidence that ambitious democratic reform is politically naïve. The opposite conclusion is closer to the truth. CAP demonstrated that government could share meaningful governing power with ordinary people on an extraordinary scale. The conflicts that emerged were not evidence that participation had failed. They were evidence that participation had begun to matter.

CAP’s architects failed because they underestimated the institutional and political work required to make ambitious democratic reform both operationally effective and politically durable. They asked local political systems to share authority without building foundational buy-in and sufficiently broad governing coalitions. They expected communities to make consequential decisions without giving them adequate time, resources, or institutional support to build trust and shared governing capacity. And because Congress democratized decisions about poverty without pairing participation with a sufficiently robust redistributive agenda, communities were too often forced to compete over scarcity rather than to govern abundance together.

These were not failures of democratic aspiration. They were failures of institutional design, and they point toward a different question for our own time. What would it look like to pursue the same democratic ambition as CAP with 60 years of additional institutional learning?

Lessons for Today

The answer to that question begins with recognizing that the decades since CAP have produced two complementary traditions of democratic innovation.

One is deliberative democracy: institutions like civic assemblies that select small numbers of demographically balanced participants to stand in for the broader public as they deliberate on tricky policy questions and develop recommendations for government. Deliberative democracy helps broaden and deepen public voice, strengthen democratic legitimacy, and provide government with better information for navigating difficult policy choices.

The other tradition is co-governance: long-term partnerships between legislators or public agencies with organized communities in which both parties lean into their respective strengths as they share responsibility for designing, implementing, overseeing, and improving public policy. The central actors are not randomly selected residents, but member-based community power-building organizations like labor unions, voters’ groups, tenant organizations, parent organizations, and disability groups that are rooted in the communities most affected by the policy in question.

Deliberative democracy asks how representative members of the public can inform and improve government decisions. Co-governance asks how public institutions should share governing authority with organized communities over time. Healthy democracies need both approaches—and, indeed, some models like participatory budgeting draw from both traditions.

Taken together, CAP and the last six decades of experimentation with deliberative democracy and co-governance teach us at least four key lessons.

First, democracy requires civic infrastructure. CAP assumed that government could simply invite residents into decision-making and expect shared governance to emerge. Experience has shown otherwise.

Democracy depends on civic infrastructure: the relationships, organizations, leadership, knowledge, trust, and institutional capacity that enable communities and governments to solve problems together over time. Both community organizations and government have key roles to play in building this infrastructure.

Community power-building organizations do far more than advocate for particular interests: they contribute capacities that government rarely possesses on its own. They cultivate leaders, organize participation, build long-term relationships and trust, develop community knowledge, and sustain democratic engagement between election cycles. Government brings complementary strengths: legal authority, professional administration, technical expertise, and the resources necessary to implement policy at scale. Neither can govern effectively without the other.

And in a political economy warped by the outsized power of billionaires, finance, and corporations, government has a vested interest in cultivating independent community organizations. They can serve as a countervailing force to concentrated economic power and as a bulwark helping to protect popular democracy.

Second, democratic institutions should be matched to democratic problems. CAP’s goal of “maximum feasible participation” was an inspired ambition but should not have been pushed top-down through a single institutional solution.

Some policy challenges require sustained partnerships with communities who possess lived experience and organized collective power. In arenas like enforcing labor standards, protecting tenants, addressing racial inequities, advancing environmental justice, improving public health, strengthening schools, and building neighborhood safety, co-governance with organized, member-based community organizations can be powerfully effective. With deep roots in frontline communities and deep knowledge of particular policy issues, these organizations can help design policy, improve implementation, monitor public performance, and strengthen accountability in ways government cannot accomplish alone.

Other policy challenges call for different democratic tools. Sometimes a policy challenge requires collecting input from and building political agreement among a broad and diverse cross-section of the public at large, as when establishing overall budget priorities, citywide land use policy, or climate adaptation strategies. In these instances, civic assemblies and other broadly representative participatory models can help both government and stakeholder organizations better understand and act on broad public values and priorities.

The goal here is matching the right democratic institution to each governing challenge.

Third, democratic infrastructure must be supported, institutionalized, and scaled.

If CAP’s greatest mistake was trying to transform local governance too quickly through a single federal program, today’s democratic reformers face almost the opposite problem.

Over the past several decades, hundreds of promising democratic innovations have emerged across the country and around the world. Yet in the U.S., most remain isolated pilots that depend on time-bound philanthropic grants or brief windows of support from political leaders. Democratic participation beyond elections works, but we have yet to fund and institutionalize the civic infrastructure needed to bring co-governance and participatory democracy to scale.

The next generation of democratic reform should combine CAP’s ambition with today’s institutional sophistication. That does not require imposing a single national model. Quite the opposite. Federal and state governments should establish broad democratic commitments—modern equivalents of “maximum feasible participation”—while providing funding, technical assistance, evaluation, and accountability systems that encourage local government and community organizations to engage. They should also build in enough flexibility for localities to slow down and move at the speed of trust, and to adapt institutional models to their local circumstances. And foundations have a critical role to play in helping fund pilots plus the community infrastructure, learning, and capacity needed for co-governance and participatory democracy to succeed.

Examples of this approach are already emerging. Chicago is supporting co-governance pilots between multiple city agencies and community organizations. New York City’s new Office of Mass Engagement is experimenting with new forms of participation and co-governance. Washington State convened six Community Assemblies that brought people together from frontline communities to shape public priorities. Across the country, worker centers, tenant unions, public health partnerships, environmental justice organizations, and other community institutions are working with governments not simply to provide input, but to help design, implement, monitor, and continuously improve public policy.

These initiatives differ substantially from one another, and they should. Their common purpose is not institutional uniformity. It is building a democratic state capable of governing in genuine partnership with the people it serves.

The fourth and final lesson from CAP is that democratization is most successful when it is part of a larger political and institutional strategy. In addition to incentivizing and investing in local co-governance and participatory democracy, the federal government, states, and foundations have other roles to play too.

Federal and state government—both legislators and agencies—can pursue co-governance and broader participation themselves. Washington State, as we have seen, funded Community Assemblies, and Wisconsin’s Department of Natural Resources has been working with the publicly elected Wisconsin Conservation Congress since 1937. On the federal level, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Environmental Protection Agency have pursued a range of initiatives involving stakeholder organizations and the public in governance.

Foundations often have a big role in getting such efforts off the ground too. The Ford Foundation’s Gray Areas program was a key precursor to CAP, and more recently Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, among others, has helped fund co-governance work across multiple states and localities.

Co-governance and participatory democracy are also most successful when federal and state governments invest in robust redistributive social welfare that meet people’s material needs. Part of the challenge CAP faced was that localities were tasked with administering poverty and scarcity rather than being given the chance to govern shared abundance.

With our economy concentrating wealth at the top and pushing the rest of us into varying levels of economic precarity, too many people have fallen into interpreting the world through the lenses of zero-sum competition and scapegoating. This divides us from one another and corrodes democracy. For co-governance and all models of democracy to succeed, we need a baseline of economic security, solidarity, and a sense of shared abundance and possibility.

What we lack is not institutional knowledge. It is political ambition.

Reviving our Democratic Ambition

Sixty years ago, the United States attempted to institutionalize shared governance on a scale we have never since matched. CAP failed because the institutions needed to sustain that ambition had not yet been developed. But many of those institutions exist today.

Elections and representative democracy should of course remain the foundations of US government. The lesson of CAP is not that elected officials and public agencies should surrender their authority. It is that they can govern more effectively by learning when, where, and how to share it.

We know far more today than we did in 1964 about how to institutionalize effective, long-term partnerships between public agencies and organized communities. We know how to convene representative deliberative bodies that can grapple with complex public questions. We know how to invest in civic infrastructure, leadership development, facilitation, technical assistance, and institutional design so that participation becomes an enduring feature of governance rather than a fleeting experiment.

What we lack is not institutional knowledge. It is political ambition. If the great democratic achievement of the twentieth century was expanding who could vote, the greatest opportunity of the twenty-first century may be expanding who helps govern.